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Abstract: Philosophers of criminal punishment widely agree that
criminal punishment should be “proportional” to the
“seriousness” of the offense. But this apparent consensus is only
superficial, masking significant dissensus below the surface.
Proposed proportionality principles differ on several distinct
dimensions, including: (1) regarding which offense or offender
properties determine offense “seriousness” and thus constitute a
proportionality relatum; (2) regarding whether punishment is
objectionably disproportionate only when excessively severe, or
also when excessively lenient; and (3) regarding whether the
principle can deliver absolute (“cardinal”) judgments, or only
comparative (“ordinal”) ones. This essay proposes that these
differences cannot be successfully adjudicated, and one candidate
proportionality principle preferred over its rivals, in the abstract; a
proportionality principle only makes sense as an integrated part of
a more complete justificatory theory of criminal punishment. It
then sketches a proportionality principle that best fits the
responsibility-constrained pluralist theories of criminal
punishment that currently predominate. The proportionality
principle it favors provides that punishments should not be
disproportionately severe, in noncomparative terms, relative to an
agent’s culpability in relation to their wrongdoing.

Introduction
Philosophers and theorists of the criminal law agree, almost without
exception, that criminal punishment should be “proportional” to the
offense, and that “disproportionate” punishment is unjust.
But
proportionality is a relational concept, and broad agreement among
theorists at proportionality’s surface masks a substantial divergence of
views regarding what, precisely, should be proportional to what. Most
notably, scholars invoke at least nominally different features or qualities of
offender (e.g., blameworthiness, fault, culpability) or offense (e.g., severity,

harmfulness, wrongdoing) to which, they contend, punishment should be
proportional. In addition, some scholars have fastened on different features
of punishment (censure or condemnation, hard treatment or deprivation) to
which the injunction of proportionality attaches. Combining the diversity
of positions on these two relata yields a multiplicity of proposed
proportionality principles or constraints.
That’s not all. Every proffered proportionality principle weighs against
punishments that are excessively severe by reference to the relevant property
of offense or offender. Only some, however, also proscribe or militate
against punishments deemed excessively lenient.
That is, some
proportionality principles are infringed only by “supra-proportionate”
punishments, whereas others are infringed by supra-proportionate and
“infra-proportionate” punishments alike.
Furthermore, some
proportionality principles have the capacity to police individual
punishment-offense pairs, whereas others concern only how one such pair
compares to other pairs. This is the difference between what theorists call
“cardinal” and (merely) “ordinal” proportionality.
In short, principles of proportionate punishment vary on at least three
dimensions: on the relata that ought to be proportional; on whether
punishments are objectionably disproportionate only when too severe or
also when not severe enough; and on whether proportionality can deliver
only ordinal rankings or also cardinal measures, even if very rough. This
article chooses sides on these three disputed issues. It advocates a
proportionality principle, grounded in principles of humanity, that bars
punishments that (a) are excessively severe (b) in absolute terms, relative to
(c) the offender’s culpability in regard to wrongdoing. I do not contend that
this is the single true or correct proportionality principle but only that it fits
best with a family of theories of punishment’s justifiability that enjoy
widespread current support.
This business is conducted over three sections. Section 1 presents a
quick overview of the literature, demonstrating that scholars have
championed a varied array of principles of penal proportionality. Section 2
takes a step back, addressing the more general question of what, if anything,
justifies the imposition of legal punishment. It endorses what I take to be
the dominant current scholarly view—namely, that punishment can be
morally justified by pursuit of, or conformity with, a plurality of goods and
reasons, but only if constrained by principles of distribution (as H.L.A. Hart
termed them) 1 that respect differences in one or another aspect of the
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offender’s “responsibility” for the offense. I call this widely held position
“responsibility-constrained pluralism.”
Section 3 puts forth a sensible principle of proportionality for
responsibility-constrained pluralists. First, this proportionality principle
constrains punishment only from above, not also from below, because that
is its point or function: to serve or embody the responsibility constraint.
Second, the upper limits it supplies in one case need not involve
comparisons to other punishments inflicted in other cases; it is absolute
(though contextual), not comparative. Third, the relatum against which a
punishment is measured for excessiveness centers on the offender’s
culpability. For want of space, this section cannot defend any one
specification of a culpability-based proportionality relatum, but does aim to
aid further work on that topic by demarcating the most important
possibilities.

1. Principles of Proportionality: A Partial Typology
Although champions of proportionality occasionally remark on the wide
scholarly support that “the principle of proportionality” enjoys,2 use of the
definite article can mislead. Norms with very different content travel under
that label, and no single version appears to be accepted by more than a
handful of contributors to a substantial literature. This section focuses on
three distinct respects in which proposed proportionality principles differ.
These are not the only dimensions on which supposed and defended
principles of penal proportionality vary. They might not be the three most
important or illuminating. They’re important enough to repay attention.

mitchberman@law.upenn.edu. This paper has been prepared for a symposium on
“Proportionality in the Criminal Law,” sponsored by the Georgetown Institute for the Study
of Markets and Ethics, and slated to appear in Criminal Law and Philosophy. I am grateful to
John Hasnas and Doug Husak for arranging the event and inviting my participation, and to
my fellow symposiasts for helpful comments and criticisms on a prior draft.
1 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 3-13 (1968).
2 E.g., Jesper Ryberg, Proportionality and the Seriousness of Crimes, in MICHAEL TONRY ED.,
OF ONE-EYED AND TOOTHLESS MISCREANTS: MAKING THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME 51, 51
(2020) (“The fact that the principle of proportionality has come to play a significant role in
modern penal theory is not surprising.”); Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy
of Punishment, 16 CRIME & JUSTICE 55, 56 (1992) (contending that “[s]anctioning rationales
differ from one another largely in the emphasis they give the principle of proportionality”
and, therefore, that “the choice among sanctioning rationales is, in important part, a choice
about how much weight to give to proportionality”).
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First and most saliently, scholars advance varied views regarding the
relata that are the principle’s substance. Common formulations provide
that punishment should be proportional to the “gravity” or “seriousness”
of the offense.3 But these versions are only as informative as are the notions
of offense gravity or seriousness they incorporate.4 Everybody understands
that these formulations simply kick the can down the road until their
constituents are specified. Whether proceeding via a conception of offense
seriousness or gravity, or bypassing those notions entirely and cutting more
quickly to the chase, theorists propose a diverse assortment of offense or
offender characteristics to which punishment ought to be proportional.
Many commentators focus entirely on properties that might sensibly be
thought “internal” to the offender, such as the offender’s
“blameworthiness,” “culpability,” “guilt,” or “desert.” 5 Several focus
outward, arguing that the seriousness that matters to proportionality is just
the harm that the offense has caused,6 or the disruption to “civil order” that
it threatens.7 Still others meld these two views, treating offense seriousness
for proportionality purposes as some usually unspecified function of both
blameworthiness (or culpability) and harm.8
That is one side of the equation, the side that concerns what punishment
should be proportionate to. But the other side—the punishment side—can
also be parsed or carved in different ways. Punishment is often defined as
See, e.g., id., at 56; JOHN DEIGH, FROM PSYCHOLOGY TO MORALITY: ESSAYS IN ETHICAL
NATURALISM 232 (2019); Matt Matravers, The Place of Proportionality in Penal Theory: Or
Rethinking Thinking about Punishment, in TONRY ED., OF ONE-EYED AND TOOTHLESS
MISCREANTS, supra note 2, at 76, 77.
4 See, e.g., JOHN GARDNER, Crime: In Proportion and in Perspective, in OFFENCES AND
DEFENCES 222 (2007) (noting that “everything turns on the applicable conception of ‘the
crime’ and the specification of its axes of gravity”); Mirko Bagaric & James McConvill, Giving
Content to the Principle of Proportionality: Happiness and Pain as the Universal Currency for
Matching Offence Seriousness and Punishment Severity, 69 J. CRIM. L. 50, 51 (2005).
5 See, e.g., GARDNER, supra note 4, at 225-26; ANDREW ASHWORTH & ANDREW VON HIRSCH,
PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING 134 (2005).
6 Bagaric & McConvill, supra note 4.
7 DEIGH, supra note 3, at 232. I assess Deigh’s proposal in Principles of Proportionate
Punishment: Comments on John Deigh, From Psychology to Morality: Essays in Ethical
Naturalism, 102 PHIL. & PHENOM. RES. __ (forthcoming 2021).
8 See, e.g., HART, supra note 1, at 234 (remarking sympathetically on “the deeply
entrenched notion that the measure [of proportionality] should not be, or should not only
be, the subjective wickedness of the offender but the amount of harm done”); von Hirsch,
supra note 2, at 81 (“The seriousness of crime has two main elements: the degree of
harmfulness of the conduct and the extent of the actor’s culpability.”); R.A. DUFF,
PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 135 (2001) (arguing that, for purposes of
“the principle of proportionality,” “criminal seriousness is usually taken to be a function of
harm plus culpability”); Matravers, supra note 3, at 76 (same).
3
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condemnation or censure effectuated or communicated by means of hard
treatment or deprivation.9 Drawing on this definition, Doug Husak argues
that “[e]ach of these components gives rise to its own distinctive principle
of proportionality”: a “principle of proportionality in censuring” provides
that “the amount of reprobation deserved by an offender should be a
function of the blameworthiness of his offence,” while a “principle of
proportionality in hard treatment” directs that “the severity of hard
treatment deserved by the offender should be a function of the seriousness
of his offence.”10
Scholars differ on a second issue too. A proportionality principle
proscribes, or weighs against, 11 disproportionate punishments. But
punishment could be disproportionate, relative to the relevant offense or
offender characteristics, either by being too severe or by being too lenient.
To coin terms, call a proportionality principle that is offended only by
excessively severe punishments a “ceiling principle,” one that is offended
only by excessively lenient punishments a “floor principle,” and one that
requires that punishments be neither too severe nor too lenient a “bracket
principle.” 12 I am not aware of any scholar who glosses or defends
proportionality as only a floor principle. But some do explicitly defend only
ceiling principles, 13 while many others explicitly defend bracket

See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES ch. V (1985); DUFF, supra note 8,
at xiv-xv.
10 Douglas Husak, Strict Liability, Justice, and Proportionality, in A.P. SIMESTER ED.,
APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 81, 95-97 (2005).
11 Which is it: “proscribes” or “weighs against”? Is this supposed “principle” really a
principle (a contributory rather than decisive norm), or is it a rule (a decisive norm)? My view
is the former, but I mean to be agnostic on this question for now.
12 The ceiling/bracket distinction tracks the difference between what Jesper Ryberg calls
“negative” and “positive” “proportionalist views.” Ryberg, supra note 2, at 73. Antony Duff,
however, uses the qualifiers “negative” and “positive” to mark a different proportionality
distinction. See infra note 14.
13 See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Is Proportionality in Punishment Possible, and Achievable, in
TONRY, ED., OF ONE-EYED AND TOOTHLESS MISCREANTS, supra note 2, at 1, 4 (“[P]roportionality
theory . . . support[s] two injunctions with which most people, citizens, scholars, and
professionals alike, would say they agree. First, no one should be punished more severely
than he or she deserves. Second, all else being equal, people who commit more serious crimes
should be punished more severely than people who commit less serious ones, and vice
versa.”); Leo Katz & Alvaro Sandroni, Strict Liability and the Paradoxes of Proportionality, 12
CRIM. L. & PHIL. 365, 366 (2018) (construing the principle of “proportionate punishment” as
a “prohibition of excessive punishment”); Hoare v. The Queen (Australia 1989) (“A basic
principle of sentencing law is that a sentence of imprisonment . . . should never exceed that
which can be justified as appropriate or proportionate to the gravity of the crime . . . .”).
9
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principles.14 Several are modestly ambiguous, focusing almost entirely on
proportionality’s role in protecting against excessively severe punishments,
while defining the principle they favor in terms that would appear to
proscribe excessively lenient punishments too.15
Third, commentators disagree about whether proportionality is only a
comparative principle, one that addresses “how severely crimes should be
punished relative to each other,”16 or can also provide absolute guidance,
by providing that some given punishment for some given offense can be
disproportionately severe (or lenient) without regard for the punishments
imposed on other offenders for other offenses. The standard vocabulary,
thanks to Andreas von Hirsch, terms these versions of proportionality
“ordinal” and “cardinal,” respectively, though I’ll follow Göran DuusOtterström in preferring “absolute” and “comparative.” 17 Terminology
aside, the orthodox view holds that “[t]he proportionality principle is
inherently comparative,”18a position that provokes proportionality’s critics
to complain that it “render[s] the appeal to proportionality chimerical as a
basis for limiting punishment.” 19 Accordingly, other defenders of
proportionality maintain that proportionality can furnish absolute
14 See, e.g., von Hirsch, supra note 2, at 79-83; GARDNER, supra note 4, at 222; GIDEON YAFFE,
THE AGE OF CULPABILITY: CHILDREN AND THE NATURE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 61 (2018)
(contending that proportionality militates against punishments either “disproportionately
small” or “disproportionately large”); DUFF, supra note 8, at 137-41 (arguing for a “negative”
principle of proportionality that provides only that punishments should not be
disproportionate, as against a “positive” principle that directs that punishments should be
proportionate, but emphasizing that disproportionate punishments are objectionable
whether disproportionately harsh or disproportionately lenient).
15 See, e.g., Youngjae Lee, Why Proportionality Matters, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1835, 1836, 1838,
1843-44 (2012) Morris J. Fish, An Eye for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of
Punishment, 28 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 57, 61, 62, 68 (2008).
16 ASHWORTH & VON HIRSCH, supra note 5, at 138.
17 Göran Duus-Otterström, Weighing Relative and Absolute Proportionality in Punishment,
in TONRY ED., OF ONE-EYED AND TOOTHLESS MISCREANTS, supra note 2, 30, 34.
18 Tonry, supra note 13, at 4 n.2; see also, e.g., HART, supra note 1, at 25 (“The guiding
principle is that of a proportion within a system of penalties between those imposed for
different offences where these have a distinct place in a commonsense scale of gravity. This
scale itself no doubt consists of very broad judgements both of relative moral iniquity and
harmfulness of different types of offence.”); id. at 234 (arguing that the principle of
proportionality “is concerned with the relationships within a system of punishment between
penalties for different crimes, and not with the relationship between particular crimes and
particular offences”); GARDNER, supra note 4, at 222 (“the proportionality principle does not
in itself specify or even calibrate the scale of punishments which the State may implement,
but simply indicates how different people’s punishments . . . should stand vis-à-vis another .
. . .”).
19 Nicola Lacey & Hanna Pickard, The Chimera of Proportionality: Institutionalising Limits
on Punishment in Contemporary Social and Political Systems, 78 MODERN L. REV. 216, 227 (2015).
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standards, even if such standards “are ultimately supplied by sociocultural
conventions” and subject to substantial ineliminable vagueness.20
For all these reasons, perhaps among others, broad agreement on the
proposition that punishment should be proportional to the offense is largely
uninformative. As Gideon Yaffe recently observed, proportionality remains
“one of the most elusive of the central concepts in the theory of
punishment.”21

2. Justifying Punishment: Responsibility-Constrained Pluralism
Why do so many principles of proportionality compete for our
endorsement? It’s partly due to the fact that they’re not freestanding norms
depending entirely on their own independent merits. Instead, a principle
of proportionality is ideally an integrated component of a broader theory of
criminal law that includes an account of what justifies the institution of legal
punishment, or its infliction in individual cases, in the first place.
Proportionality principles are less like groceries to choose from a market
and more like ingredients to select for a dish. Because theorists justify
punishment on varied grounds, it stands to reason that preferred
proportionality principles will vary too. A quasi-Kantian theory on which
justice demands that we give wrongdoers what they deserve, a Benthamite
theory structured entirely to maximize aggregate pleasure net of pain, and
a Hartian mixed theory will naturally conceptualize proportionality
requirements differently (if at all). So the path toward a principle of
proportionality reasonably starts with some basic commitments of criminal
law theory.
Obviously, this is not the place to develop and defend a theory of the
justifiability of legal punishment. I’ll have to content myself with simply
putting on the table one that I have argued for elsewhere. 22 I call it
“responsibility-constrained pluralism.” It is not merely the view I favor, but
also, and more importantly, a view that plausibly predominates among

E.g., Duus-Otterström, supra note 17, at 42-44.
YAFFE, supra note 14, at 61. See also, e.g., Michael Tonry, Preface, in TONRY ED., OF ONEEYED AND TOOTHLESS MISCREANTS, supra note 2, AT vii, vii (bemoaning “[t]hat so central a
concept [as proportionality] remains so poorly understood”).
22 See Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and Justification, 118 ETHICS 258 (2008); Mitchell N.
Berman, Modest Retributivism, in KIM FERZAN & STEPHEN MORSE EDS., LEGAL, MORAL, AND
METAPHYSICAL TRUTHS: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL MOORE (2016); Mitchell N. Berman, The
Justification of Punishment, in ANDREI MARMOR ED., THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 141 (2012).
20
21
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current philosophers of criminal law. Views pressed by all of the following
scholars, among others, fall within this broad family: Doug Husak, John
Gardner, Larry Alexander and Kim Ferzan, Leo Zaibert, C.L. Ten, Michael
Cahill, and Thom Brooks.23 As a class, such theories possess three important
features: they are pluralist, retributivist-friendly, and constrained.
First, pluralistic theories insist that punishment can secure a variety of
goods, or can be supported by a variety of reasons, and that the plurality of
relevant goods and reasons bear on the all-things-considered permissibility
of the punishment inflicted. Most of these theories take a consequentialist—
or “instrumentalist”24—cast: they provide that the infliction of punishment
can only be justified by the net good consequences that it will produce, or
can reasonably be expected to produce. Unlike classical utilitarian
justifications of punishment, however, versions of pluralistic
instrumentalism are all, well, pluralistic. Rather than reducing all value to
hedonic states, they maintain that there are several or many different goods
at which punishment could reasonably aim, not all of which are reducible
to a single currency: aggregate social welfare, a reduction in moral
wrongdoing, the promotion of individual autonomy, the stability and
security of a civil order, and more.
Second, some or many pluralists about punishment are retributivists.
Pluralism about punishment might seem challenging for retributivists if we
define retributivism as a “backward-looking,” or anti-consequentialist,
justification for punishment. But that is not necessary.25 Retributivism is
commonly defined as a view that justifies punishment at least in part by
reference to a wrongdoer’s desert. If a wrongdoer deserves to suffer, or
deserves some negative or hostile response, in virtue of their (culpable)
See, e.g., Douglas Husak, Why Punish the Deserving?, 26 NOUS 447 (1992); GARDNER,
supra note 4, at 214-15, 281-82; LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND
CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW ch. 1 (2009); LEO ZAIBERT, RETHINKING PUNISHMENT
(2018); C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT 6 (1987); Michael T. Cahill, Punishment
Pluralism, in MARK D. WHITE ED., RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND POLICY 25 (2011);
THOM BROOKS, PUNISHMENT (2012).
24 See VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 13
(2011) (advocating that forward-looking justifications for punishment be labeled
“instrumentalist” rather than “consequentialist” precisely to make less likely the
misunderstanding that such accounts must embrace consequentialism as a comprehensive
moral theory).
25
I examine consequentialist (“instrumental,” “teleological”) versus nonconsequentialist versions of retributivism in Mitchell N. Berman, Two Kinds of Retributivism,
in R.A. DUFF AND STUART P. GREEN EDS., PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 433
(2011). For elaboration on the recent prevalence of pluralistic retributivism see my Review of
Rethinking Punishment, NOTRE DAME PHIL. REV., Nov. 4, 2018, available at
https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/rethinking-punishment/.
23
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wrongdoing, then one of the goods at which punishment may justifiably
aim, the realization of which can contribute to punishment’s overall
justifiability, is the state in which the wrongdoer’s negative desert is
satisfied. If this is only one good among several that punishment can secure,
and especially if this one good does not assume clear priority over other
goods, then the account is pluralist. But if realizing negative deserts is a
goal that the state may permissibly pursue, one that has sufficient weight to
make a difference, at least sometimes, to whom, how, and how much, the
state ought to punish, then the account also rightly qualifies as
retributivist.26
This point warrants emphasis because contributions to the
proportionality literature frequently characterize retributivism in narrow
terms that bias the debate over proportionality principles. Take Michael
Tonry’s recent claim, in a valuable volume of essays on the topic, that “all
retributivists agree that the seriousness of the crime should be the sole or a
primary determinant of the punishment’s severity.”27 But retributivists do
not all agree on what Tonry says they do (at least so long as enough content
be given the terms “seriousness” and “a primary determinant” to avoid
vacuity). For one, Husak is a retributivist, yet I read him to be rejecting
Tonry’s view when contending that “[i]f we have good reason to inflict
different amounts of punishment on two offenders who have committed
equally serious crimes, we should not be worried that our decision does not
preserve proportionality.” 28 I consider myself a retributivist, yet I too
would not assign crime seriousness quite the privileged role that Tonry
claims for it. Tonry’s version of retributivism naturally entails that
proportionality will be a bracket principle: punishment severity should be
proportional to offense seriousness—neither too much nor too little. The
pluralistic retributivism defended by Husak, myself, and others need not.
(While we’re here, it’s important to distinguish a “principle of
proportionality” from “proportionality theory,” understood as a sentencing
reform proposal championed by von Hirsch, Ashworth, and Tonry among
others. Stripped to fundamentals, that program advises legislatures to set
sentences at levels that comport with judgments about relative offense
seriousness, and thus adopts an ordinal bracket principle of proportionality
by definition. In contrast, I take philosophical investigations into candidate
principles of proportionality to be first-order inquiries of political morality
See Berman, Modest Retributivism, supra note 22, at 46-47.
Tonry, supra note 13, at 6.
28 Douglas Husak, Why Legal Philosophers (Including Retributivists) Should Be Less Resistant
to Risk-Based Sentencing, in PREDICTIVE SENTENCING: NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES
44-45 (2019), quoted in Tonry, supra note 13, at 4.
26
27
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into the in-principle justifiability of state punishment. Such investigations
lie some distance upstream from the promotion and defense of a
supposedly implementable program of criminal law reform.29)
Third, the overwhelming majority of pluralists about punishment’s
justifying goals or ends, whether retributivist or anti-retributivist, advocate
a moral constraint on pursuit of those ends. This position traces back to
Hart’s insistence that pursuit of a consequentialist “general justifying aim”
should be constrained by principles of “distribution.”30 The first principle
of distribution—distribution in liability—provides that punishment could
justly be imposed only on “an offender for an offense.” The second
principle—distribution in amount—Hart never fleshes out with great
precision. He is often read, however, as contending that it “forbid[s] us . . .
to punish the guilty more harshly than they deserve.” 31 Regardless of
whether this was Hart’s own position, exactly, it is plainly one that many
contemporary punishment theorists embrace, though sometimes
referencing an offender’s guilt, blameworthiness, or culpability as a
substitute for, or supplement to, the language of desert.
In an influential article, John Mackie dubbed the theory “negative
retributivism.”32 But that’s a misleading name for the view if, as I have
already suggested, we reserve the “retributivist” label for accounts in which
realizing an offender’s negative desert counts as an affirmative reason (of
some strength) for the state to inflict punishment.33 Antony Duff’s proposed
term for this position—“side-constrained consequentialism,” 34 —is an
improvement, though I’d offer two (friendly) amendments. First, because
proponents of the view overwhelmingly recognize a plurality of legitimate
punishment objectives, I’d substitute “pluralism” for “consequentialism.”
Second, because the side constraint is furnished by respect for some feature
of the offender’s responsibility, I’d make that fact explicit. Thus are we led
to “responsibility-constrained pluralism.” If not the single predominant
In general, it strikes me that some anti-retributivists are insufficiently attentive to
differences between more “pure” and more “applied” retributivist projects, too often
assuming that critiques of the latter burn the former too. For want of space, though, I’ll have
to leave this complaint as an undefended assertion.
30 Hart called these constraints retributivist though few commentators today would
endorse that characterization.
31 DUFF, supra note 8, at 11.
32 J.L. Mackie, Morality and the Retributive Emotions, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3 (1982).
33 It is widely assumed that “negative retributivism” (that desert is a necessary condition
on just punishment) is entailed by any form of “positive retributivism” (that desert provides
a reason to punish). I challenge that inference in Berman, The Justification of Punishment, supra
note 22, at 154.
34 DUFF, supra note 8, at 11-14.
29
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contemporary justificatory theory of legal punishment, it’s a strong
candidate for that title.

3. Responsibility-Constrained Pluralism and Proportionality
For those who adopt any version of a responsibility-constrained pluralism,
the most likely role for a principle of punishment proportionality will be
obvious: it gives content to the responsibility constraint. Sure enough, this
is precisely how Mackie viewed things. Negative retributivism, he said,
provides not solely that only the guilty may be punished, but also “that even
one who is guilty must not be punished to a degree that is out of proportion
to his guilt.” 35 Similarly, David Wood describes the side constraints on
“Hart’s theory of punishment” as providing, first (distribution in liability),
“that we never punish the innocent,” and second (distribution in amount),
that “we never impose disproportionately harsh punishment on the guilty.”36
This, in short, is the most plausible and attractive proportionality principle
for responsibility-constrained pluralists. I’ll designate this principle
PoP/RCP. This section fleshes it out, exploring what implications PoP/RCP
has for the three respects identified in Section 1 in which principles of
proportionality vary.
First, though, a word about principles of proportionality and
retributivism. It is a striking assumption of much of the recent
proportionality literature that proportionality is a concern for retributivists
alone.37 This section rejects that assumption. PoP/RCP is a principle for
responsibility-constrained pluralists, whether retributivist or antiretributivist.38 Moreover, to reiterate a point made only a few paragraphs
earlier, even some of the pluralists I’m calling retributivist might not
register as retributivist under some of the more restrictive conceptions of
that concept.

Mackie, supra note 32, at 4 (emphasis added).
David Wood, Punishment: Consequentialism, 5 PHIL. COMPASS 455, 465 (2010) (emphasis
added). See also, e.g., Richard L. Lippke, Some Surprising Implications of Negative Retributivism,
31 J. APP. PHIL. 49, 49 (2014).
37 The supposition that principles of proportionality are of unique or particular concern
to retributivists runs through most of the chapters in TONRY ED., OF ONE-EYED AND TOOTHLESS
MISCREANTS, supra note 2.
38 Accord Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J.
263, 266 (2005).
35
36
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3.1. Ceiling, not bracket
First, PoP/RCP is only a ceiling principle, not a bracket principle,
because that’s the role it plays in the theory: it serves the responsibility
constraint, and that constraint aims to protect individuals from excessively
harsh treatment by the state, not to guard against unduly lenient treatment.
That proportionality is a ceiling principle will be obvious, or nearly so,
to responsibility-constrained pluralists who are anti-retributivist. If you
don’t believe that wrongdoers ever deserve anything bad or disagreeable,
or that, even if they do, furnishing those bads is not a permissible aim of a
legitimate state, then you won’t see any need for or value in a normative
principle that condemns punishments that are too lenient relative to the
offender’s responsibility. (By way of contrast, you will see value in a
principle that condemns punishments too lenient relative to, for example,
the community’s interest in physical security.)
But responsibility-constrained retributive pluralists might be expected
to view things differently.39 As retributivists, they believe that punishment
should not be too lenient relative to the offender’s desert, and as
constraintists, they believe that punishment should not be too excessive,
also relative to desert. It might seem to follow that there is no single
principle of proportionality that all or most responsibility-constrained
pluralists could be expected to share. Rather, responsibility-constrained
retributive pluralists endorse a bracket principle of proportionality while
their anti-retributivist cousins reject the floor principle, thereby leaving
themselves with only a ceiling principle.
That would be the right lesson, I think, if pluralist retributivists believed
that the injunctions that states (a) should ensure that wrongdoers receive
the punishment they deserve, and (b) should not inflict punishment
excessive relative to a wrongdoer’s desert, are of comparable force or
stringency. But very few do believe that; if they did, they probably
wouldn’t be pluralists. And if responsibility-constrained retributive
pluralists do not assign the same force or stringency to the floor and ceiling
aspects of a putative single bracket principle, then it is doubtful that their
two positions are best conceived as dual aspects of a single principle. If
retributivist and anti-retributivist pluralists (as a group) assign the same
normative force to a principle that militates against punishments
excessively severe relative to offender responsibility, and if retributivist
pluralists assign lesser force to any principle or consideration that militates
against punishments that are unduly lenient relative to offender
39 I am grateful to Doug Husak for provoking me to say more in response to this line of
thought.
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responsibility, then it seems more perspicuous to describe responsibilityconstrained pluralists, whether retributivist or anti-retributivist, as aligned
in espousing a ceiling principle of proportionality—a principle of political
morality according to which state-inflicted punishment should not be
excessively disproportionate relative to some feature of offender
responsibility. This is true even while it is also true that retributivists in that
large class also believe, while their anti-retributivist peers deny, that
wrongdoers deserve to suffer (or to be punished, or to experience their
wrongdoing as personally costly, etc.) on account of their wrongdoing, and
that furnishing such negative desert counts among the ends that a just state
should pursue.
More generally, pluralists of both retributive and anti-retributive
stripes, don’t need a separate proportionality principle to bear against
unduly lenient punishments—not because pluralists are indifferent to the
possible costs of great leniency, but because it is the very fact of pluralism
with respect to the goods at which punishment should aim that already
guards against undue leniency.
3.2. Absolute, not (merely) comparative
Second, PoP/RCP aims to have absolute, noncomparative bite, not solely
comparative (“ordinal”) force. To see why, it is helpful to advert now to
another respect, additional to those canvassed in section 1, in which
proposed proportionality principles differ—with regard, not to their
contents, but to their grounds or justifications.
A principle of proportional punishment does not rest on its own moral
bottom. It is not a moral primitive. Rather, if a principle of proportionality
does merit our allegiance, it will be grounded in or entailed by principles or
values that have independent moral status. This is why proportionality
defenders often say that proportionality is required by “principles of
justice.”40 That might be so, but because there are so many conceptions of
justice, invocation of the bare concept, standing alone, is about as
informative as is the claim that punishment severity should be proportional
to offense “seriousness.” And when proportionality theorists do give
content to the capacious concept of justice—or when they bypass the
language of “justice” entirely—they collectively invoke all manner of values
and principles as grounds for proportionality.
Despite the variety of terms that theorists invoke, and to overgeneralize
only a little, it seems to me that the principal animating values are of two
40 E.g., von Hirsch, supra note 2, at 68; GARDNER, supra note 4, at 235 (proportionality
concerns “justice between offender and offender”); DEIGH, supra note 3, at 232, 242.
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types: fairness or equality on the one hand,41 and humanity on the other.42
It seems further that there is a non-accidental relationship between the value
that supposedly grounds proportionality and the character of the
proportionality principle that it grounds: principles grounded in fairness
and equality tend to be only comparative, whereas principles grounded in
humanity aspire to be absolute. To the extent this is so, whether PoP/RCP
is an absolute or merely comparative proportionality principle depends on
the moral values or principles that demand that the state’s pursuit of plural
ends via the infliction of punishment be constrained in the first place.
When the issue is thus posed, it strikes me as adequately clear—though
also hard to establish in a short space—that a responsibility-based
constraint on punishment is grounded (chiefly) in considerations of
humanity, not in considerations of equality. The animating thought is that
personhood or human dignity or the like ground moral limits on the
permissibility of using persons for good ends even when some such use is
licensed by the individual’s own wrongdoing. Wrongdoers do not forfeit
protection against all impositions that, but for their wrongdoing, would be
rights-violating. And the reason they don’t is because we are constrained
by duties of humanity in how we may treat a person, constraints that have
force entirely apart from how we have treated others.
Of course, it is one thing to say that PoP/RCP has noncomparative
aspirations, another to conclude that those aspirations can be realized. The
reason to think that purportedly absolute proportionality principles cannot
deliver on what they promise is plain enough: it seems highly implausible
that the specific point, or vague line, at which some quantum of punishment
of an offender for an offense becomes disproportionately great is wholly
acontextual. Even putting aside epistemic difficulties in knowing where
that point or line resides, it just seems hard to swallow that the same x units
of punishment are disproportionate for offense N—and that x-y units
wouldn’t be—across all places and times. It may seem a short step to the
conclusion that a coherent proportionality principle can only be relative to
other punishments meted out within that jurisdiction to other offenders.
But this conclusion moves a little too quickly. PoP/RCP maintains that
punishment should not be excessive relative to (some aspect of) the
See, e.g., von Hirsch, supra note 2, at 85 (“the proportionality principle rests on a
particular value—that of equity”); Lee, supra note 15, at 1838 (“To achieve fairness, the State
must punish in a manner that is consistent with principles of proportionality: it must treat
its citizens equally.”).
42 See, e.g., DEIGH, supra note 3, ch. 12 (principles of humanity); Tapio Lappi-Seppälä,
Humane Neoclassicism: Proportionality and Other Values in Nordic Sentencing, in TONRY, supra
note 2, at 209 (same).
41
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wrongdoer’s moral responsibility. As a gradable adjective, “excessive” is a
context-sensitive predicate.43 Thus, what is excessive will be sensitive to
“the prevailing political culture,”44 and “reflect diverse historical, cultural,
and political influences.” 45 Part of the relevant context is the general
punishment regime, at least to the extent it is accepted as legitimate or
appropriate, and perhaps even if otherwise. In this way, it is true that other
sentences form part of the context needed to determine whether a given
punishment is excessive. Yet the fact that context-sensitivity is built into
even supposedly noncomparative assessments of punishment
disproportionality does not reduce such assessments to comparative ones.
For a comparative proportionality principle, other punishments are more
than just part of the relevant context of application; they are ineliminable
components of the principle’s content: whether a given punishment is
excessive or disproportionate is defined by reference to other punishments.
That is not true of non-comparative proportionality principles
notwithstanding what I acknowledge to be their context-sensitivity.46
Does it follow that all is hunky-dory if the state inflicts radically
disparate punishments on two offenders for identical offenses so long as
neither punishment is excessive relative to offender responsibility? Not at
all. Such disparities do not infringe the proportionality principle (as I
construe it). But proportionality is not the only principle that bears on the
justice or permissibility of particular inflictions of punishments, 47 and an

See, e.g., Christopher Kennedy, Vagueness and Grammar: The Semantics of Relative and
Absolute Gradable Adjectives, 30 LINGUISTICS & PHIL. 1 (2007).
44 Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, supra note 42, at 228.
45 Tonry, supra note 13, at 21.
46 My claim here is related to Duus-Otterström’s distinction between “contextsensitivity” and “convention-sensitivity,” Göran Duus-Otterström, Retributivism and Public
Opinion: On the Context Sensitivity of Desert, 12 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 125, 132 (2018), but claims
more. For one thing, his distinction is offered as a way to make sense of different accounts
of what a wrongdoer deserves while mine concerns what punishments are excessive. These
are different inquiries so long as desert is not the full measure of excessiveness—a matter to
be explored in subsection 3.3. Moreover, Duus-Otterström allows only that social context
affects the quality and amount of harm that a given act of wrongdoing imposes or risks. He
is certainly right about that. I’m contending further that context, including legal practices,
bear on what would be an excessive punitive response even holding the harms of a given
criminal act constant.
47 See, e.g., von Hirsch, supra note 2, at 78 (emphasizing that “[p]roportionality . . . is not
the only value involved—there may be countervailing reasons of various sorts for departing
from proportionality”); but see id. at 75-76 (deeming it a “fundamental objection” to the
“range theories” associated with Norval Morris that they “would allow two offenders,
whose conduct is equally reprehensible but who are considered (say) to present differing
degrees of risk, to receive different punishments”).
43
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equality principle directing that likes should be treated alike is also part of
the full moral accounting.48
3.3. From “responsibility” to “culpability in regard to wrongdoing”
I have argued thus far that the principle of proportionality that goes
with constrained pluralism—PoP/RCP—is a noncomparative ceiling
version of proportionality: it prohibits, or weighs forcefully against,
punishments that are excessive relative to some aspect of an offender’s
responsibility. I’ve needed the “some aspect of” qualifier because
proportionality theorists do not usually say that punishment should be
proportional to a wrongdoer’s “responsibility,” full stop (and it wouldn’t
be very informative if they did). Instead, they draw from a large number of
responsibility terms, saying that punishment should be proportional to, or
not excessive relative to, the offender’s “desert,” “blameworthiness,”
“culpability,” “fault,” or “guilt.”49 So the last task is to identify the particular
responsibility relatum to which, per PoP/RCP, punishment should not be
excessively disproportionate.
To emphasize what is probably obvious, we’re interested in concepts,
operators, or properties, not word meanings. I have no doubt that some
significant portion of the nominal diversity regarding the proportionality
base is only nominal: Taylor says that punishment shouldn’t be
disproportionate to offender “blameworthiness,” Jhankar says it shouldn’t
be disproportionate to offender “culpability,” but they have the same idea
in mind. On the other hand, it’s not all nominal: surely diverse concepts are
floating in the poorly regimented sea of our linguistic practices. In my view,
the multiplicity of terms in the literature corresponds moderately well to a
multiplicity of underlying concepts, and that four distinct moral
responsibility concepts figure prominently in the story: DESERT,
BLAMEWORTHINESS, FAULT, and CULPABILITY. So our task comprises two
Some defenders of equality-grounded bracket principles of proportionality agree that
principles of humanity supply some upper noncomparative limits on punishment severity,
but believe that this is not the function of proportionality principles, rightly understood,
which are essentially comparative. See, e.g., GARDNER, supra note 4, at 222 n.15; von Hirsch,
supra note 2, at 77-78. On my picture, this gets things backwards: the principle of
proportionality is grounded in principles of humanity and is essentially absolute, but
punishment is also constrained by principles of equality which are comparative.
49 See, e.g., Jacob Bronsther, Vague Comparisons and Proportional Sentencing, 25 LEGAL
THEORY 26, 36 (2019) (“moral desert”); Stephen F. Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, 46 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 127, 127 (2009) (“blameworthiness”); John F. Stinneford, Punishment Without
Culpability, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 659 (2012) (“culpability”); Michael J.
Zimmerman, The Immorality of Punishment: A Reply to Levy, 9 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 113, 116 (2013)
(“guilt”).
48
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parts: to disambiguate the potentially relevant moral concepts, fine-tuning
where possible; and, if more than one responsibility concept remains
eligible for the role, to explain why the proportionality relatum is the one
that it is. I won’t complete that two-part task in this final section but hope
to make some progress.
Let’s start with desert and blameworthiness, a pair of concepts that
differ in one essential respect but are alike in another.50 Take desert first.
Although much about desert remains mysterious, this is common ground:
desert serves a “pro” or “favoring” function. That A deserves some
treatment or state of affairs is not a normatively inert fact. It has normative
force or significance, a significance often put in terms either of value or of
reasons and duties. To a first pass, that A deserves some treatment increases
the impersonal value of the state of affairs in which that treatment obtains
for A, or creates reasons of some stringency for some suitably situated
others to bring that state of affairs about.51 This is a desert-general truth: it
applies across the waterfront of valid desert claims regardless of their
contents.
Of course, we’re not interested in all desert claims, such as whether Pat
deserves a medal or Jody deserves a second chance. We’re interested in
“negative desert” or “retributive desert”: the desert that supposedly links
some bad consequence for an agent (punishment, suffering, hard treatment,
what-have-you) to some wrongful behavior by the agent (wrongdoing,
blameworthy wrongdoing, culpable willings, or the like). Retributivists
are like moviegoers: they believe that the placeholders “bad consequence”
and “wrongful behavior” can be given content such that it is true,
sometimes or often, that A deserves a bad consequence in virtue of their
wrongful conduct, where their deserving such bad consequences makes it
good that they get them, or makes it the case that somebody should give it
to them.
Blameworthiness is different. That an agent is blameworthy does not
by itself favor blaming them. Rather, to be blameworthy is to forgo or forfeit
an immunity from being subject to a range of blaming practices involving
directed criticism, censure, castigation, distancing, retaliation, infliction of
costs or hardship, punishment, and the like, that you would otherwise
enjoy. 52 This difference in normative function can be highlighted by
This discussion draws from my manuscript, “Blameworthiness, Desert, and Luck”
(unpublished ms., dated 6/25/20).
51 In putting things this way, I aim to be agnostic regarding which normative concept,
good and reason, is passing the buck to the other.
52 I’m with Michael Zimmerman, see Michael Zimmerman, Varieties of Moral
Responsibility, in RANDOLPH CLARKE, MICHAEL MCKENNA & ANGELA M. SMITH, EDS., THE
50
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reflecting on the proposition, ubiquitous in punishment theory, that “to be
blameworthy is to deserve blame.” On the picture I offer, that is strictly
false: to be blameworthy is to be liable to blaming practices, not to deserve
them. This is why even anti-retributivists object, say, to strict liability
offenses. Their complaint is not that strict liability licenses punishment
without negative desert—after all, many anti-retributivists believe that
negative desert is no part of our moral universe, that nobody deserves to be
punished53—but that it impermissibly results in punishment of persons who
haven’t made themselves liable to punishment or censure.
That’s the difference: desert serves a favoring function, and
blameworthiness serves a liability function. Here’s the similarity: both
blameworthiness and desert are relational concepts with a triadic structure.
This is famously true of desert, as Joel Feinberg observed a half century ago:
an agent deserves a “desert object” (DO) on account of some quality or
action of the agent, the “desert base” (DB). 54 It is true as well of
blameworthiness: an agent is liable to “blaming practices” (BP) in virtue of
some quality or action of the agent, A’s “blaming base” (BB).
Now we reach fault and culpability. “Fault,” of course, is the standard
term for what I’ve just called the “blaming base.” An agent is at fault when
failing to satisfy a standard fairly imposed upon them. And their being at
fault renders them fairly liable to blame. In contrast, fault is not the base for
retributive desert. Many retributivists believe that the desert base for
negative desert is better framed as “culpability,” or “culpable wrongdoing,”
where culpability consists of morally insufficient regard or concern—and
thus a morally objectionable quality of will—in action. Culpability is a type
of fault: it is the fault of failing to meet the moral demand, imposed on us
all, to conduct ourselves with adequate regard for the rights and interests
of others. So there is no faultless culpability. But because culpability is only
one type of fault, there is nonculpable fault. The sentry who falls asleep is

NATURE OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY: NEW ESSAYS 45 (2015), in strongly resisting the suggestion
that there exists a single behavior or mental state properly denominated “blame,” and that
our task is to excavate its “essence.” Justin D. Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini, The Contours of
Blame, in JUSTIN D. COATES & NEAL A. TOGNAZZINI, BLAME: ITS NATURE AND NORMS 3, 8 (2013).
53 Anti-retributivists have diverse views about desert. Some (e.g., Victor Tadros) reject
desert claims categorically. They deny that A deserves DO in virtue of DB for all values of
A, DO, and DB. Others (e.g., Nathan Hanna) grant the truth of some desert claims but deny
that a person can ever deserve a treatment or a state rightly describable as “bad”; they accept
“positive” desert but reject “negative” desert. Still others (e.g., David Dolinko) can accept
the wrongdoers instantiate negative desert while denying that the state is ever justified in
acting to realize their negative desert.
54 JOEL FEINBERG, Justice and Personal Desert, in DOING AND DESERVING (1970).
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at fault, hence liable to reasonable blaming practices, even if not culpable,
hence not deserving any disagreeable consequences or ill-treatment.55
To summarize:
DESERT: What it is for an agent, A, to deserve some treatment or
state because of some conduct or quality of A’s is for it to be
impersonally non-instrumentally good that A get that treatment or
state, or for some agent(s) to have (special or stringent) reason to
bring that treatment or state about, in virtue of A’s conduct or
quality.
NEGATIVE DESERT: An agent, A, deserves bad consequences, or a
setback to their interests, in virtue of their culpable wrongdoing.
CULPABILITY: What it is for an agent, A, to be morally culpable for
conduct is for that conduct to issue from A’s insufficient regard for
the interests of others, and thereby to instantiate a morally
objectionable quality of will.
BLAMEWORTHINESS: What it is for A to be blameworthy for some
conduct, event, or state is for A to be at fault with regard to that
conduct, event, or state, and thereby to be rendered liable to
reasonable blaming practices (by some agent(s)) to which A would
otherwise be morally immune.
FAULT: What it is for A to be at fault with regard to some conduct,
event or state is for A to engage in that conduct, or to allow that
event to occur or state to obtain, in consequence of A’s failure to
satisfy a fairly imposed standard.
If this stab at conceptual analysis and disambiguation is broadly on
target, how does it advance our understanding of the responsibility notion
that serves as the base relatum for PoP/RCP? Here are three suggestions.
First, their triadic character renders contentions that punishment should
be proportional (or not excessively disportionate) either to “desert” or to
“blameworthiness” ambiguous. Such claims could refer, on the one hand,
to the treatments that are favored (for desert) or to which the agent is liable
(for blameworthiness), or, on the other, to the conduct (culpable
wrongdoing, fault) that serves as grounds or bases for such treatments.
Second, it is not very plausible that punishment severity should be
constrained in proportion either to the-suffering-that-the-wrongdoer-

55 Or so I argue in Negligence and Culpability: Reflections on Alexander and Ferzan, __ CRIM.
L. PHIL. __ (forthcoming 2021).
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deserves (the DO) or to the blame-to-which-the-wrongdoer-is-liable (the
BP), and essentially for the same reason.
Again, take desert first. If a wrongdoer’s desert object is to serve as a
constraint on legal punishment, the content of that constraint would most
naturally enjoin the infliction of punishment more severe than the bad
consequences that the agent deserves, not the infliction of punishment
excessive relative to those deserved bad consequences. Because what is
deserved and what is inflicted (as punishment) are measured in the same
currency, it is intuitively likelier that the severity of bad consequences that
are deserved would serve as a cap on the severity of bad consequences that
may justly be inflicted rather than as a base against which still more severe
punishments are assessed for disproportionality. This is not an argument
that an offender’s desert object does not supply the constraint on
punishment severity that responsibility-constrained pluralists seek. It’s a
surmise that, if the desert object—i.e., the bad consequences that the
wrongdoer deserves—does play that role, it does so in lieu of a
proportionality principle, not as a relatum within it. The principle “no more
than what the wrongdoer deserves” is different from the principle “not
disproportionate relative to what the wrongdoer deserves,” and is not a
principle of proportionality.
Much the same is true about blameworthiness. I have said that to be
blameworthy is to be rendered liable to blaming practices. Which practices,
and how much of them? Unfortunately, too many forms of blame and too
diverse an array of considerations appear on reflection to be relevant to
permissible blaming to permit any highly informative or detailed answer to
these questions. Though it will strike some as a dodge, I fear that we can
say little more than that a blameworthy agent is made liable to “reasonable
blaming practices,” where reasonableness is a function of the factors that
make the actor’s conduct faulty in the first place and much else besides:
whether they had done it before; the agent’s background and upbringing
and the breadth of their opportunities to avoid wrongdoing; the treatment
accorded other, similarly situated actors; the “standing” of those who
would impose blame; the likelihood that a strong response would have a
positive effect on future behavior by this agent or by similarly situated
others, and so forth.56 But whatever kinds of blame a faulty agent becomes
liable to, the practices to which they are liable do not constitute a promising
56 For myself, I think it clear that the consequences traceable (in the right ways) to a
blameworthy act also bear on the reasonableness of a given blaming response. But I
acknowledge that that’s modestly controversial. It is much less controversial than whether
consequences of a wrongful act bear on the actor’s negative desert, although the questions
are often conflated.
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proportionality base. It’s a natural thought that a wrongdoer shouldn’t be
subjected to harsher punishment than they are liable to; it’s an awkward
thought that the punishment shouldn’t be disproportionately severe
relative to what they’re liable to. This suggestion, just like the idea that
punishment should not be disproportionate to the bad consequences that a
wrongdoer deserves, involves, as it were, “one thought too many.”
Third, it is very plausible that punishment should not be excessively
severe relative to the agent’s culpability in wrongdoing. Whether it is not
only plausible but correct is a question that I cannot pursue in this already
overlong contribution, in part because a persuasive answer can’t be worked
out from the relevant concepts, but involves substantive claims about justice
or political morality and therefore requires substantive arguments. Instead,
I’ll close with two observations about a culpability-centered proportionality
base.
The major question that divides scholars who defend some version of a
culpability-centered
proportionality
principle
is
whether
the
proportionality base that constrains punishment severity involves only
internal factors that constitute an agent’s culpability or also includes harms
that their wrongdoing realizes or causes. It is important to note that there
are (at least) three options in this space, not just two. Call the position that
culpability alone constrains punishment severity “culpability in
wrongdoing.” On this view, punishment of the attempted murderer and of
the successful murder should be equally severe, ceteris paribus. But two
different positions contrast with this culpability-only account. The more
distant alternative might be dubbed “culpability and harm.” It maintains
that punishment should be constrained by some amalgam of culpability and
“the amount of harm done.” An intermediate view—I’ll call it “culpable
wrongdoing”—includes within the proportionality base any harms that are
constitutive of the wrong done (unlike the first view), but not harms that are
caused by the wrong done (unlike the second). All of these positions appear
to have scholarly defenders—Alexander and Ferzan of “culpability in
wrongdoing”; 57 Hart, von Hirsch, and Duff of “culpability and harm”; 58
Gardner of “culpable wrongdoing.”59

See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 23, at ch.5.
See supra note 8.
59 GARDNER, supra note 4, at 227-34 (arguing that wrongdoing is partly internal to
blameworthiness, because “blameworthiness is always blameworthiness in respect of some
action”). The same could be true of culpability, even though Gardner himself appears to
treat culpability and blameworthiness interchangeably, id. at 225-27, which I am arguing
against.
57
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Whichever approach one takes to the relevance of harm (harm counts
insofar as it is constitutive of the wrong; harm counts whenever constitutive
of, or caused by, the wrong; harm doesn’t count), it is a separate question
whether the culpability that matters is limited to states of mind occurrent
with the willed bodily movements that make up the actus reus of the offense
or of the wrong. I believe that it does not. To the contrary, the culpability
that constrains punishment severity, in my judgment, is the agent’s
culpability “in relation to their wrongdoing.” This is a temporally extended
notion, and thus embraces pre-action behaviors and associated mental
states (e.g., planning, premeditation) as well as post-action ones (e.g.,
apology and remorse).60

Conclusion
Criminal law theorists overwhelmingly agree that, to be morally just,
criminal punishment must comport with a principle of proportionality. Yet
they are not close to agreement regarding any of the principle’s elements—
which relata must be kept in proportion, whether the principle condemns
only supra-proportionate punishments or infra-proportionate punishments
too, whether proportionality has absolute (cardinal) or only comparative
(ordinal) implications, what values or considerations explain its force, and
more. Hence this symposium.
This article has maintained that the start of wisdom is to get clearer on
the more general theory of punishment in which the supposed principle of
proportionality is embedded. After all, a principle of proportionality that
best fits a positive retributivist justification of punishment will differ in
function and content from one that fits a classical utilitarian justification (if
one does). The most compelling and widely accepted justification of
punishment, I have claimed, is some version of a responsibility-constrained
pluralism. A principle of proportionality for such a theory, I have further
argued, will prohibit only excessively severe punishments, not also unduly
lenient ones, and will endeavor to measure and police excessiveness in
terms that are at least partly “cardinal” or absolute, not wholly dependent
on comparisons to other punishments imposed in the jurisdiction on other
offenders. The feature of the offender, or the aspect of their responsibility,
to which punishment should not be disproportionately severe presents a
tougher question. I have suggested (without supportive argument) that it
60 For tentative explorations, see my Negligence and Culpability, supra note __, at section
4; Gabriel S. Mendlow, Punishment Proportionate to What?, __ CRIM. L. & PHIL. __ (this issue).
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is the offender’s culpability in relation to their wrongdoing. The chief
upshot of this version of a principle of proportionality is that the state may
not inflict objectively harsh punishment on wrongdoers who exhibit low
levels of culpability even when it has genuine reasons—reasons that the
pluralistic justificatory theory recognizes and affirms—to punish severely.
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